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CRIMINAL LAW
OVERVIEW

During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed several issues significant to the criminal sentencing process and
considered the adequacy ofjury instructions on the good faith defense
to mail fraud charges.
In each of the sentencing cases, the Tenth Circuit upheld criminal
sentences notwithstanding strong arguments favoring reversal. In the
lead case on sentencing, the court permitted sentencing under the federal kidnapping statute to a term of years greater than life imprisonment, and ruled that the federal parole statute authorizes a minimum
parole eligibility date to be set at any time up to one-third of that term of
years. In another case, the Tenth Circuit allowed a general statute to be
applied in sentencing for an offense covered under a more specific statute, even though the general statute prescribed a greater punishment.
In a third sentencing case, the court held that there is no right to a jury
in a restitution determination proceeding.
In the sole mail fraud case discussed in this survey, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a specific instruction on the "good faith" defense must be
given where evidence supports that defense and the instruction is
requested.
I.

A.

SENTENCING

Defining Statutory Limits: United States v. O'Driscoll
1.

Background

In United States v. O'Driscoll,I the defendant, Michael James
O'Driscoll, was convicted of armed bank robbery2 and kidnapping,3 and
4
sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 25 and 300 years respectively.
The trial court further held that O'Driscoll would be eligible for parole
only after serving 99 years of the latter sentence. 5
The charges arose out of a two-month series of grisly criminal acts
1. 586 F. Supp. 1486 (D. Colo. 1984), afd, 761 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1985).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (1982). The sentence rendered in connection with the
bank robbery was not an issue on appeal.
3. The charge of kidnapping was brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982) which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or
carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in
the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when:
(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce;
(2) any such act against the person is done within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States;
shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
4. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 595.
5. Id. The district court purported to derive its authority for the 99-year no-parole
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committed by the defendant. The trial record disclosed that O'Driscoll
had robbed and "pistol whipped" a Denver merchant. He then drove to
a suburban shopping center where he and a girlfriend took a hostage
and departed for Kansas. Leaving his girlfriend at a hotel in Salina,
Kansas, O'Driscoll drove the hostage several miles to a wooded area
where he shot the hostage several times, killing him. 6 Thereafter,
O'Driscoll traveled to Massachusetts where he perpetrated a bank robbery. 7 Following his eventual arrest in Puyallup, Washington,
O'Driscoll plead guilty to the bank robbery charge and was convicted by
8
a jury on the kidnapping charge.
Recognizing its authority to consider extraneous information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant in arriving at a sentencing decision, 9 the trial court noted additional facts
aggravating O'Driscoll's culpability. During the sentencing hearing,
O'Driscoll admitted to the commission of seven bank robberies and to
the heavy consumption of alcohol, cocaine, and other drugs. He had
been previously convicted of at least eight misdemeanor offenses, six
serious traffic violations, and three or four felonies, two of which were
prior acts of bank robbery and kidnapping. At the time of his sentencing, O'Driscoll had sevcnty-one charges pending against him in seven
different courts. ' 0
On appeal, O'Driscoll argued that the 300-year sentence, 99 years
to be served without possibility of parole, was outside applicable statutory limits, an abuse of the trial court's discretion, and cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment."
2.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion

The Tenth Circuit, Judge Barrett writing for a unanimous threejudge panel, found both the sentence and the parole eligibility rulings to
be within statutory limits for the crime of kidnapping, within the proper
period from 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1) (1982) (repealed Oct. 12, 1984; effective Nov. 1, 1986)
which provides:
(b) Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court having jurisdiction to
impose sentence, when in its opinion the ends ofjustice and best interest of the
public require that the defendant be sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, may (1) designate in the sentence of imprisonment imposed a
minimum term at the expiration of which the prisoner shall become eligible for
parole, which term may be less than but shall not be more than one-third of the
maximum sentence of imprisonment by the court.
6. 761 F.2d at 591-92. A post mortem examination established that the hostage had
been shot ten times. One shot had been fired while O'Driscoll pressed the gun against the
hostage's chest.
7. Id. at 592.
8. Id. at 592-93.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1982) states that -[no] limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court ... may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."
10. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 593.
11. Id. at 595, 598-99.
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discretion of the trial court, and not in violation of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Initially, the court addressed O'Driscoll's interpretation of the penalty provision of the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201, which
permits "imprisonment for any term of years or for life."' 12 O'Driscoll
pointed to the Revisor's Note accompanying the 1948 consolidation of
the federal kidnapping laws to support his contention that life imprisonment is the maximum sentence allowed under section 1201.13
O'Driscoll's argument that Congress intended to alert sentencing judges
that life imprisonment was available as a maximum sentence was rejected
by the court without discussion. 14 The court was also unpersuaded that
bringing a 300-year sentence within the meaning of "any term of years"
rendered the specially added "or for life" clause superfluous. Rather,
the court preferred the government's explanation that setting "life" as
the maximum term of imprisonment would make "any term of years"
superfluous.1 5 In addition, the court emphasized that the disjunctive effect of "or for life" implied that sentencing a defendant to a term of
16
years greater than life was permissible.
Turning its attention to the federal parole law, 18 U.S.C. § 4205,17
the court cited legislative history behind the predecessor parole statute 18 indicating that the judicial and executive branches share the responsibility for determining how long a prisoner should serve. 19
Acknowledging that section 4205(a) permits a prisoner who is serving a
life sentence to become eligible for parole ten years after incarceration,
the court held that subsection (b)(1) stands independently from subsection (a), permitting a judge to prohibit parole eligibility for a period up
to one-third of any sentence when "the ends ofjustice and the best interest of the public" so require. 20 Under such circumstances, the court
ruled, section 4205(b)(1) allows the trial judge to "bypass the Parole
Commission," setting parole eligibility at any point during the first onethird of the sentence imposed. 2 1 The court advised that the kidnapping
12. Id. at 595-96.
13. Section 1201 consolidates former 18 U.S.C. §§ 408a, 408c (repealed 1948). H. R.
REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The Revisor's Note suggested that "for any
term of years or for life" was substituted for the penalty provision of the predecessor
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 408a, "for such term of years as the court in it discretion shall determine," in order to remove all doubt as to whether "term of years" included life
imprisonment.
14. 761 F.2d at 596 (emphasis added).
15. Id. (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 597-98 (emphasis in original).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1982) (repealed Oct. 12, 1984; effective Nov. 1, 1986).
Subsection (a) provides:
(a) Whenever confined and serving a definite term or terms of more than one
year, a prisoner shall be eligible for release on parole after serving one-third of
such term or terms or after serving ten years of a life sentence or of a sentence
over thirty years, except to the extent otherwise provided by law.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (1958) (repealed 1976).
19. 761 F.2d at 596 (citing S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, repinted in 1958
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3891, 3892).
20. 761 F.2d at 596.
21. Id. at 596-97 (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189 n.15 (1979);
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statute sentencing provision should be read in connection with the parole law, but in the case of a conflict, the former, being more specific,
22
governs.
In an amicus curiae brief, it was further argued that the sentence imposed upon O'Driscoll was in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d)2 3 "which
authorizes the Parole Commission to release a prisoner sentenced to
more than 45 years, including a life term, when he has served 30 years,
unless 'there is reasonable probability that he will commit any Federal,
state, or local crime.' "24 The court responded that the sentence did not
interfere with application of parole guidelines, but merely fixed the date
25
when the parole mechanism is to become operative.
On the eighth amendment issue, the court ruled that setting parole
eligibility beyond the life expectancy of the defendant did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. 26 O'Driscoll contended that the parole
statute, contrary to judicial customs, was used in his case to increase,
rather than decrease, the punishment prescribed by the substantive
crime statute. 27 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument based on its
previous finding that the sentence did not exceed statutory limits. 2 8

Fi-

nally, abiding by widely accepted principle, the court stated that its review of a sentence generally ends with the determination that statutory

limits have not been exceeded. 2 9 While not articulating a specific standard of review for abuse of discretion, the court found the extreme sentence rendered by the trial court easily justified given O'Driscoll's
"callous, vicious propensities."13 0
3.

Analysis
a.

The Kidnapping Sentence

Section 1201 provides that a defendant convicted thereunder "shall
be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life."'3 ' The
statute's predecessor directed that imprisonment be required "for such
term of years as the court in its discretion shall determine." '3 2 There is,
as the Tenth Circuit observed, a dearth of legislative history explaining
the addition of "or for life" to the discretionary term of years provision.
United States v. Pry, 625 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980); Wilden v. Fields, 510 F. Supp. 1295,
1306-07 (W.D. Wis. 1981); United States v. Whitley, 473 F. Supp. 23, 24 (E.D. Mich.
1979)).
22. Id. at 598 (citing N. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.05
(4th ed. 1984)).

23. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d) (1982) (repealed Oct. 12, 1984; effective Nov. 1, 1986).
24.

761 F.2d at 598 (citing Brief for Amicus Curiae at 4).

25. Id. at 598.
26. Id. at 599 (citing Bailey v. United States, 74 F.2d 451, 452 (10th Cir. 1934) and
United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 865
(1945)).
27. Id. at 599.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 597.
30. Id. at 600.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 408a (1946) (repealed 1948).
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As mentioned above, the Revisor's Note to the predecessor statute suggests that the change was made in order to remove all doubt as to
whether a life sentence could be imposed. 33 If the "term of years"
clause in the earlier statute was meant to include 300-year sentences, it
is odd that Congress subsequently authorized courts to impose the life
sentence. A more reasonable inference is that "any terms of years" refers to terms of imprisonment between zero years and life and that life
imprisonment is therefore the maximum possible sentence.
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning appears particularly strained when
viewed in the context of statutory punishment provisions identical to
those found in section 1201. The federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 11 11,3 4 employs the same "any term of years or for life" language

used in section 1201. That section requires imposition of the death sentence upon conviction of first degree murder unless the jury qualifies its
verdict, "without capital punishment," in which event the defendant
"shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life." For a second degree
murder conviction, the statute mandates that the guilty party be "im'35
prisoned for any term of years or for life."
In United States v. Black Elk, 3 6 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the sentencing language of section 111 1 in a second degree
murder case. The court held that Black Elk's fifteen year sentence was
"well below the maximum penalty for second degree murder of life imprisonment."'3 7 This language indicates the Eigth Circuit's belief that
life imprisonment is a ceiling above which "any term of years" may not
extend. The Tenth Circuit, in O'Driscoll, thus finds itself in conflict with
the Eighth Circuit in its interpretation of "any term of years." Further,
the O'Driscollcourt's reasoning, applied to section 11 11, would allow a
longer term of imprisonment for second degree murder than for first
degree murder, a result unlikely to have been intended by Congress.
b. Parole Eligibility
In practical terms, the court's construction of 18 U.S.C. § 4205, the
federal parole statute, was the most consequential aspect of the opinion. 38 Section 4205, governing time of eligibility for parole release,
consolidates two previous sections3 9 and is set forth, accordingly, in two
33. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 111t(a) (Supp. 11 1984). Two
other federal criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1982) (governing rape) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 (1982) (governing conspiracy), share the punishment language of section 1201.
Neither legislative history nor judicial interpretation related to those laws, however, are
enlightening.

35. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
36. 579 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1978).

37. Id. at 51. See also United States v. Martell, 572 F. Supp. 110, 113 (D. Mont. 1983),
afd without opinion, 742 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1772 (1985).
38. The difference between life and 300 years imprisonment is surely less interesting
to the convicted felon than whether he will be entitled to parole review during his natural
life expectancy.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) is based upon former 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1948) (repealed

1976); 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) is based on former 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (1958) (repealed 1976).
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parts.
Subsection (a) provides that a prisoner serving more than one year
shall be eligible for release on parole after serving one-third of his sentence "or after serving ten years of a life sentence or of a sentence over
thirty years." ' 40 While the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a prisoner
serving a life sentence becomes eligible for parole no later than ten
years after incarceration, 4 1 it is especially noteworthy here that the tenyear ceiling applies equally to sentences over thirty years. The House
Conference Report on section 4205 explains that subsection (a) mandates eligibility for parole consideration "in the case of a prisoner sentenced to life or more than 30 years, after serving 10 years of his
42
sentence."
The Tenth Circuit did not deny the plain meaning of subsection (a).
Instead, the court held that section 4205(b)(1) authorizes the trial judge
to prohibit parole eligibility for a period up to one-third of any determined sentence and thus to "bypass" subsection (a). 43 This holding was
predicated on the court's position that subsection (b)(1) was designed to
enable the sentencing judge to set parole eligibility at a date later than
4
4
would be allowed under subsection (a).

Legislative history of section 4205(b) is unenlightening. Former 18
U.S.C. § 4208, enacted in 1958, is the predecessor statute to section
4205(b). Its legislative history, relied upon by the Tenth Circuit, provides clear statements of congressional intent underpinning the statute.
Prior to enactment of section 4208, eligibility of federal adult prisoners
for parole was governed solely by former 18 U.S.C. § 4202, predecessor
to the present section 4205(a). 4 5 Under section 4202, prisoners sentenced to a term over one year were entitled to parole consideration
after serving one-third of their total sentence or, in the case of a life
46
sentence or sentence of more than forty-five years, after fifteen years.
Testifying before a House Judiciary Subcommittee, a representative of
the Judicial Conference of the United States explained that section 4208
was designed "to authorize the court in sentencing a prisoner to fix an
earlier date when a prisoner shall become eligible for parole .... -47
Moreover, in the Report of the Subcommittee to Consider the Problem
of Disparities in Sentences, the subcommittee chairman recommended
approval of legislation, which later became section 4208, "to authorize
the court, in sentencing a prisoner, to fix an earlier date when the pris'48
oner shall become eligible for parole."
40. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (repealed Oct. 12, 1984; effective Nov. 1, 1986).
41. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 596.
42. H. CONF. REP. No. 94-838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 335, 357 (emphasis added).
43. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 596.
44. Id.
45. Grasso v. Norton, 520 F.2d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1975).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1948) (repealed 1976).
47. S.REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1958 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEWS 3891, 3896 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 3900 (emphasis added). Additional statements in the Senate Report on sec-
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Further legislative history cited by the Tenth Circuit advises that
section 4208 permitted the trial court to share with the executive branch
49
the responsibility for determining how long a prisoner should serve.
The court relied upon this legislative history to affirm, implicitly, the
trial judge's statement that O'Driscoll's release should be a matter of
executive clemency and not of legal entitlement. Read in context, the
statement clearly refers to judicial cooperation with the attorney general
and the parole board in determining parole eligibility based upon the
individual prisoner's progress. 50 Nowhere in the legislative history is
the shared responsibility statement associated with an extreme sentence
in which the prisoner's only hope of release rests in executive clemency.
Other federal appellate decisions interpreting section 4205 and its
predecessors support the position that a court's power to fix a parole
eligibility date is conferred to allow parole at a date earlier than would
result under the automatic parole eligibility provision. In Grasso v. Norton, 5 1 the Second Circuit reviewed committee hearing testimony of the
author of section 4208. Arguing that section 4202 created a purely arbitrary limitation on parole eligibility, the author, Congressman Emmanuel Cellar, testified that section 4208 would "permit the release under
supervision at an earlierdate, should a prisoner's response to the rehabili''5
tation justify it. 2
The Seventh Circuit, in Garafola v. Bensen, 53 also examined the history of parole eligibility authority. The court noted that prior to the
adoption of section 4208, the statutory scheme did not include any grant
of authority to the sentencing court or the Board of Parole that would
permit release of a prisoner earlier than the one-third point established by section 4202. 54 The Seventh Circuit found that section 4208
"supplied the omission by permitting the judge either to shorten the
mandatory minimum imprisonment period ((a)(1)) or to eliminate the
tion 4208 similarly indicate that the legislative intent behind the section was to empower
judges to fix parole eligibility at a time less than the period required for automatic eligibility. See id. at 3902 ("[T]he court may designate in the sentence imposed a time when the
prisoner may become eligible for parole, which time may be less than, but shall not be more than,
one-third limitation now provided in section 4202." (emphasis in original)); id. at 3905 ("The
court will be authorized to . . . fix the maximum term of the sentence and (1) direct that
the prisoner shall be eligible for parole at any time up to one-third this maximum, as now
provided by law." (emphasis added)).
49. O'DriscoUt, 761 F.2d at 596 (citing S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3891, 3892).

50. S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 3892 ("The purpose of this section is to provide the court with optional procedures which will enable it to impose sentences which may be indeterminate in nature. This
would permit the court, at its discretion, to share with the executive branch the responsibility for determining how long a prisoner should actually serve. The court could . . . fix
the maximum term of the sentence and . . . specify that the Board of Parole shall decide
when the prisoner will be considered for parole.").
51. 520 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1975).
52. Id. at 32 (quoting Hearings on H. J Res. 424, H. J Res. 425, and HR 8923 Before
Subcomm. No. 3, House Comm. on theJudiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, at 5, 6 (1958)) (emphasis added).
53. 505 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974).
54. Id. at 1216.
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minimum entirely and permit the Board to parole the prisoner at any
time ((a)(2)). '' 55 Applying these same statutes, the Eighth Circuit, in
Jones v. United States, 5 6 reached the same conclusion.
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Fountain,5 7 directly addressed the relationship between subsection 4205(a) and subsection 4205(b)(1). The defendant, convicted of first degree murder,
was sentenced by the trial court to not less than 50 nor more than 150
years in prison. 58 Reviewing the record, the circuit court noted that the
district judge was "troubled" by the fact that someone sentenced to life
in prison can be paroled after serving only ten years under 18 U.S.C.
§ 4205(a). 59 The circuit court concluded that was why the sentencing
judge imposed a term of years instead of life. 60 The court continued:
But we are not clear how the judge thought this form of
sentence would affect the defendant's parole eligibility dates,
when as we have said section 4205(a) requires that every sentence of more than 30 years be treated, for purposes of computing that date, as if it were a sentence of 30 years. . . . True,
the next subsection [section 4205(b)(1)] allows the judge to
"designate in the sentence of imprisonment imposed a minimum term at the expiration of which the prisoner shall become
eligible for parole, which term may be less than but shall not be
more than one-third of the maximum sentence imposed by the
court." [citation ommitted]. But the apparent purpose is to allow release
on parole before the earliest date allowed by subsec61
tion (a).
Thus, the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have concluded that the power vested in sentencing courts to fix a parole eligibility date was intended to allow parole review at a date earlier
than would result under the automatic eligibility provision. The Tenth
Circuit's decision in O'Driscoll obviously works a contrary result. In addition, a brief review of the cases cited by the Tenth Circuit in support of
its holding indicates that the court misconstrued relevant language in
those decisions.
The Tenth Circuit in O'Driscoll correctly cited the United States
Supreme Court, in United States v. Addonizio, 6 2 for the proposition that
the trial court may set parole at any point up to one-third of the maxi55. Id. (emphasis added). See also United States v. Hundley, 430 F. Supp. 500 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) ("The purpose of [section 4208(a)(1)] is only to reduce below one-third of the
total sentence the period within which the prisoner may be considered for parole.") (emphasis in original).
56. 419 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1969) (Blackmun, J.) ("The reference in § 4208(a)(1)
to one-third of the maximum sentence is geared to the general parole eligibility provisions
of 18 U.S.C. § 4202.").
57. 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985).
58. Id. at 793.
59. Id. at 799.
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Smith, 703 F.2d 627, 628 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) and United States v. Pry, 625 F.2d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
925 (1981)).
62. 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
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mum sentence imposed. 63 More specifically, however, the Supreme
Court recognized, albeit in dicta, that the authority of sentencing judges
under section 4205(b)(1) is limited to selecting an "early" parole eligi64
bility date.
65
Two other cases cited by the O'Driscoll court, United States v. Pry,
6
6
and Wilden v. Fields, each state in dicta that the sentencing court may
set parole eligibility at any time up to one-third of the total sentence
imposed. 6 7 The Fifth Circuit in Py, however, pointed out that where
the trial court fails to set a parole review date during the first third of a
prisoner's sentence, section 4205(a) would kick in automatically to entitle the prisoner to review at the end of that one-third period. 68 In
Wilden, a Wisconsin federal district court stated that sentencing judges
have three alternatives in setting the parole eligibility date: (1) the onethird point, not to exceed ten years (section 4205(a)), (2) a "minimum
period" up to the one-third point (section 4205(b)(1)), or (3) immediate
parole eligibility. 6 9 Again, the terms of section 4205(a) are represented,
as they were in Pry, as a limit beyond which a sentencing judge cannot
prohibit parole eligibility, contrary to the Tenth Circuit's holding in
o 'Driscoll.
The most obvious misinterpretation of case law in the O'Driscoll
opinion occurs in the court's reliance on United States v. Whitley. 70 The
O'Driscoll court cited Whitley for the proposition that section 4205(b)(1)
allows the sentencing court to "bypass" section 4205(a) by setting a parole review date later than the ten-year limit imposed by subsection
(a). 7 1 In Whitley, the defendant moved the federal district court for sentence modification, seeking a reduction in his thirty-five year sentence. 72
The district court in Whitley stated in dicta that section 4205(b)(1) empowered the sentencing judge to "bypass" section 4205(a) by setting a
parole review date earlierthan would be effected under subsection (a). 73
Nothing in the opinion lends itself to the proposition that section
4205(b)(1) allows the judge to bypass subsection (a) by exceeding the
limits stated therein.
c.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Abuse of Discretion

The Tenth Circuit also rejected O'Driscoll's argument that his punishment, because of its length, violated the eighth amendment. 74
Adopting the "proportionality principle," the court sided with firmly es63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 597 (citing Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189 n.15).
442 U.S. at 189.
625 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 925 (1981).
510 F. Supp. 1295 (W.D. Wis. 1981).
Pry, 625 F.2d at 692; IVilden, 510 F. Supp. at 1306.
625 F.2d at 692.
510 F. Supp. at 1306.
473 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 596-97.
473 F. Supp. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 599-600.
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tablished precedent. The United States Supreme Court has held that
the duration of punishment will not constitute cruel and unusual punishment unless it is determined that the length of the sentence is "grossly
disproportionate" to the severity of the crime. 75 Further, the Court has
noted frankly that "[olutside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been
76
exceedingly rare."
Reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion, the Tenth Circuit
correctly noted that sentences within statutory guidelines are rarely disturbed. 7 7 Because the Tenth Circuit improperly defined the statutory
guidelines set forth in sections 1201 and 4205, however, the court erred
in approving the trial court's exercise of discretion.
4.

Conclusion

The heinous nature of O'Driscoll's conduct is well documented in
78
If
the respective opinions of the Tenth Circuit and the district court.
any facts justify the imposition of the maximum sentence under law,
these do. But the sentence must be rendered within statutory guidelines. The Tenth Circuit in O'Driscoll misconstrued legislative history
and judicial authority to permit a sentence and parole eligibility date
which, though perhaps deserved, exceeded statutory limits.
B.

Application of Overlapping Specific and General Sentencing Statutes:
United States v. Affierbach
1.

Background

In United States v. Afflerbach, 79 Joseph Afflerbach and four other defendants were convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming of forcibly interfering with federal officers in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 111.80 Specifically, the charges were based upon a confrontation between the defendants and agents of the Internal Revenue
75. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 377 (1982) (Powell, J.,concurring); see Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
76. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. The Court in Rummel conceded,
however, that life imprisonment for overtime parking might be considered "cruel and
unusual."
77. 761 F.2d at 597 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Schick v. Reed,
419 U.S. 256 (1974); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958)). See also Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
78. 761 F.2d at 591-95; 586 F. Supp. at 1487-92.
79. 754 F.2d 866 (10th Cir.), ceri. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3506 (1985).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1982) provides:
Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes
with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on
account of the performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Whoever, in the commission of any such acts uses a deadly or dangerous
weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
Three of the defendants were found guilty of using a deadly weapon in the commission of their crime. Under a separate count, the same three defendants were further con-

19861

CRIMINAL LA W

Service. Pursuant to a district court order, IRS special agents entered
the farm property of Afflerbach's co-defendant, Harvey Annis, to seize
machinery and equipment in satisfaction of a deficiency in Annis's federal tax payment. Before the machinery could be removed, Afflerbach
and other neighbors of Annis approached and threatened the agents
with pistols, shotguns, and a semi-automatic rifle. The agents agreed to
8
leave and abandoned the seizure effort. '
Following their convictions, the defendants were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and probation. 8 2 All of the defendants appealed, advancing numerous grounds for vacation of their respective
sentences. 8 3 The defendants claimed that the sentences imposed were
based upon a statute under which they should not have been charged.8 4
Particularly, it was urged that the specific statute prohibiting interference with IRS officers in the performance of their duties8 5 should have
been applied instead of section 11 which prohibits interference with
federal officers generally. 8 6 Because the more specific statute, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7212, prescribes a lesser punishment, the defendants argued that their
sentences were outside statutory limits and therefore constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. 8 7
2.

The Majority Opinion

The Tenth Circuit, Judge Doyle writing for the majority, 88 rejected
the defendants' "general versus specific" statutory application argument, scarcely discussing the issue. The court merely cited United States
victed of using a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
which provides for an enhanced sentence when a firearm is used. 754 F.2d at 868-69.
81. Id. at 868.
82. Id. at 869. The sentences for the section I 1I violations ranged from seven years
imprisonment to three years probation (with three months of the probation to be served in
prison). The sentences were further enhanced pursuant to section 924(c) for periods
ranging from five years probation to four years probation.
83. Id. The first six grounds, unsuccessfully argued by the defendants, were failure to
grant a motion to transfer within district, improper jury composition, illegal seizure attempted by the IRS agents, denial of effective assistance of counsel, improper instructions
to the jury, and lack of jurisdiction due to improper notice of the IRS levy.
84. Id. at 871.
85. 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Corrupt or forcible interference.
- Whoever corruptly or by force or threats of force. . . endeavors to intimidate

or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force
(including any threatening letter or communication) obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title, shall, upon
conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than
3 years, or both, except that if the offense is committed only by threats of force,
the person convicted thereof shall be fined not more than $3,000 or imprisoned
not more than I year, or both. The term "threats of force", as used in this subsection, means threats of bodily harm to the officer or employee of the United
States or to a member of his family.
86. 754 F.2d at 871.

87. Id.
88. Judge Logan joined Judge Doyle. Judge McKay filed a separate dissenting opinion. 754 F.2d at 871-73. See infra
text accompanying notes 91-104.
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v. MacClain8 9 for the proposition that sentences within statutory limits
do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The court did not,
however, cite any authority or set forth any argument in support of its
finding that the sentences imposed upon Afflerbach and the other defendants were within statutory guidelines. Nor did the majority address
the broad question of whether a general statute may allow sentencing in
excess of that permitted by a specific statute covering the same
offense. 90
3.

Judge McKay's Dissent 9 '

Judge McKay argued in dissent that the defendants were improperly
sentenced under the general provisions of section I 1 I when their conduct violated the specific.provisions of section 7212 of Title 26.92 Citing
Busic v. United States, 93 Judge McKay reiterated the "time-honored rule
of statutory construction," that a specific statute is given precedence
over a general statute, regardless of their temporal sequence. 94 Judge
McKay further noted that the rule has long been applied to prevent conviction under a general statute where a specific statute governs the same
95

criminal offense.
Judge McKay acknowledged that the clarity of the rule was somewhat blurred by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Batchelder. 9 6

In Batchelder, the Court held that the United States Attorney had

the discretion to prosecute under either of two statutes prohibiting receipt of a firearm by a convicted felon, though one of the statutes prescribed a greater punishment than the other. 9 7 Judge McKay observed
that certain courts have used Batchelder to allow the government to pro89. 501 F.2d 1006, 1013 (10th Cir. 1974) (citing Page v. United States, 462 F.2d 932
(3d Cir. 1972)).
90. Although the Tenth Circuit upheld the sentences imposed under section I 11, the
court ruled that the "deadly weapon" provision contained in section 111 precluded further enhancement of the sentences under the "firearm" provisions of section 924(c). In
support of this holding the court cited Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980), in
which the Supreme Court ruled that the defendants could not be sentenced consecutively
under the enhancement provisions of both sections 11 and 924(c). Accordingly, the Afflerbach majority vacated the probationary sentences imposed by the trial court pursuant to
section 924(c). Afflerbach, 754 F.2d at 871.
91. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting). Judge McKay concurred in the court's opinion as it
related to the first six issues addressed therein. Id. at 873. See supra note 83.
92. 754 F.2d at 872-73
93. 446 U.S. 398 (1980).
94. Id.at 871.
95. Id. at 871-72 (citing United States v. Bates, 429 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 831 (1970); Enzor v. United States, 262 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1958) (conspiracy to sell
narcotics must be punished under statute respecting conspiracy to violate narcotics laws
rather than under the general conspiracy statute), cerl. denied, 359 U.S. 953 (1959); Robinson v. United States, 142 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1944) (stealing property from the post office
must be punished under the statute specifically prohibiting that act, rather than under the
general statute outlawing theft of personal property belonging to the United States)).
96. 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
97. Id. at 123-24. (The defendant in Batchelder was convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(h) which prohibits convicted felons from receiving firearms which have traveled in
interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) permits the trial court to sentence a defendant to
a maximum of five years imprisonment for such offense. In contrast, 18 U.S.C. app.
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ceed under a general statute which contravenes the provisions of a specific statute covering the same offense. 98 However, Judge McKay
declined to follow the rule announced by those courts favoring government discretion, distinguishing Batchelder on the ground that two specific
statutes were involved, rather than one general and one specific. 99 In
addition, Judge McKay noted that Busic, decided after Batchelder, affirms
the contention that Batchelder did not undermine the doctrine that a specific statute governs over a general one.10 0
Judge McKay further stated that this doctrine is a "corollary" to the
rule of lenity which mandates resolving ambiguity in criminal statutes in
favor of the less onerous penalty,' 0 ' and also noted the Supreme
Court's reluctance to increase punishment absent a "clear and definite
legislative directive."' 0 2 Concluding that the defendants should have
been sentenced under 26 U.S.C. § 7212,103 Judge McKay would have
remanded the case to the district court for resentencing under that
statute.104
4.

Analysis
a.

The Legacy of Busic

In Busic, the United States Supreme Court faced an appeal by two
defendants convicted of armed assault of federal officers in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 111.105 In addition, each of the defendants' sentences was
0 6
enhanced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).1
As the majority in Afflerbach correctly noted, the Court in Busic 107
held that section 924(c) may not be used to increase the defendants'
sentences where section 111 contained its own "deadly weapon" enhancement provision. 10 8 But unlike Affterbach, in Busic the government
sought to enhance the defendants' sentences under section 924 rather
than under the provisions of section 111. No double enhancement question was involved in Busic. The question was, instead, whether the general enhancement provisions of section 924 could be employed by the
§ 1202(a) authorizes not more than two years imprisonment for an offense with identical
elements.) Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 116-17.
98. Affierbach, 754 F.2d at 872 (citing United States v. Carpenter, 611 F.2d 113 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980); United States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232, 237 (E.D.
Pa. 1981)).
99. Afferbach. 754 F.2d at 872.

100. Id.

101. Id. (citing Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 347 (1971)).
102. 754 F.2d at 872 (citing Simpson, 435 U.S. at 15).
103. Id. at 873 (Judge McKay noted that the absence of an enhancement provision in
section 7212 allowed section 924 to supplement the sentence without violating Busic.).
104. Id.
105. Busic, 446 U.S. at 401.
106. Id.
107. Justice Brennan wrote for a four-justice plurality. ChiefJustice Burger joined Justice Blackmun concurring. 446 U.S. at 412. Justice Blackmun's separate opinion affirmatively supported Justice Brennan's interpretation and application of Simpson. Id.
108. Busic, 446 U.S. at 399-400.
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government where the provisions of section 111 permitted an enhanced
sentence for the specific crime committed.' 0 9 In addition to its interpretation of the rule announced in Simpson v. United States, "10 the Busic Court
found its holding supported by "two tools of statutory construction relied upon in Simpson:"' I II the rule of lenity, and the principle that "a
more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one,
regardless of their temporal sequence."' 12 The Court concluded that
section 111, being the more specific statute, provided the exclusive
channel through which the defendants' sentences could be enhanced. "13
This line of reasoning was ignored by the Afflerbach court.
In the Courts of Appeals, Busic is most frequently cited for the
broad principle that a specific statute supercedes a general statute covering the same factual situation. At least six circuits, including the Tenth
Circuit, have cited the principle as a fundamental maxim of statutory
construction and have applied it to questions of statutory application,
14
including those arising outside the realm of criminal law."
In Otero Savings and Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Board,' 15 the Tenth Circuit, citing Busic, held that the general language
of a federal statute prohibiting interest bearing demand deposit accounts "must give way to the specific language" of another statute au16
thorizing one such type of account.
109. Id. at 404.
110. Simpson, 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
111. 446 U.S. at 406 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (quoting
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
112. 446 U.S. at 406 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973) (habeus
corpus is the appropriate relief for state prisoners challenging the validity of their confinement and is exclusive of other general statutory remedies, such as those provided in the
Civil Rights Act)).
113. 446U.S. at411.
114. United States v. Olinger, 759 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1985) (approving the two
"tools" of statutory construction enunciated in Busic, but holding that the more specific of
two statutes prohibiting conspiracy to commit vote fraud was, in the present case, too specific to be applied); Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 711 F.2d 370, 380-81 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (holding that hearing and notice requirements of the Atomic Energy Act are not
subject to the general "good cause" exception of the Administrative Procedure Act);
Water Transport Association v. I.C.C., 722 F.2d 1025, 1029 (2d Cir. 1983) (water carriers
denied standing because specific statute, 49 U.S.C. § 10713(d), contemplates challenges to
I.C.C. rules only by shippers and ports, although the general provisions of section 707 of
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 could be construed to permit water carriers' standing); In re
Morristown & Erie R.R. Co., 677 F.2d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that the precise
mandates of the Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act of 1979 regarding procedural requirements of an "interim" railroad operation should be followed instead of general rules
set forth in the Bankruptcy Act); Otero Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Bd., 665 F.2d 279, 282 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1132 (1st
Cir. 1981) (applying the more specific of two competing criminal statutes forbidding unauthorized entry into military danger zones). Each of the above cited cases relied expressly
upon Busic in support of its holding.
115. 665 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1981). Otero involved an appeal by savings and loan associations from an administrative finding by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board that its
customer "check-in" procedures violated the federal statutes "forbidding deposit in or
withdrawal from interest bearing accounts via negotiable or transferable instruments payable to a third party."
116. Id. at 282.
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In criminal cases, however, two other circuits have given the holding in Busic a limited reading. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Computer Sciences Corp.,' 7 permitted prosecution of the defendants therein
under mail and wire fraud statutes, although the defendants' conduct
was more specifically proscribed by the statute outlawing false claims
against the government. 1 8 The Fourth Circuit conceded, however, that
"[s]ince the particular statute controls and rules out the more general
•.

."

Busic reached a "sensible result."' 1 9 The court declined to apply

Busic and Simpson, reasoning that the defendants had violated more than
120
one statute by a single act or combination of acts.
The Sixth Circuit, however, in United States v. Schaffner, 12 1 went further, holding that the government, at the prosecutor's discretion, may
prosecute under any applicable statute. 12 2 The court rejected the district court's reliance on Busic and Simpson, citing Computer Sciences to support the position that those cases governed only situations involving two
123
sentencing enhancement provisions.
The rule announced in Busic, that a specific statute supercedes a
general statute covering the same offense, has been treated with great
deference. 12 4 The courts which have declined to apply Busic have done
so by distinguishing it, not by denying its applicability to criminal sentencing statutes.' 2 5 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Afflerbach appears
incongruous not only to the position of sister circuits regarding the Busic
rule, but to the Tenth Circuit's previous willingness to adopt the rule as
26
a guideline for statutory construction generally.1
b.

The Batchelder Problem

While the majority in Afflerbach did not cite United States v. Batchelder
to support its holding, Judge McKay noted the importance of distinguishing Batchelder from the rule of statutory construction set forth in
Busic. 127 In Batchelder, the Supreme Court reviewed a Seventh Circuit
decision in which the defendant's sentence was reduced to the maximum
length permitted by the more lenient of two otherwise identical statutes.1 28 The defendant, a previously convicted felon, was convicted of
receiving a firearm which had traveled in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h). The defendant was sentenced to five years
imprisonment under section 924(a) of the same title. 129 Noting that the
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982). cert. denied. 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
Id. at 1186-87.
Id.
Id. at 1187.
715 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1102.
Id. The applicability of Busic to sentencing statutes was not questioned.
See supra note 114.
See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
Afflerbach, 754 F.2d at 872 (McKay, J., dissenting).
Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 116-18.
Id. at 116.
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substantive elements of section 922(h) and 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) 130
are identical, and that the latter permits a maximum two-year sentence,
the court of appeals remanded for resentencing under section 1202(a).
The Supreme Court reversed, holding principally that the government
may prosecute and defendants may be sentenced under any statute violated by their conduct, "so long as it does not discriminate against any
class of defendants." 13 1 While acknowledging the partial redundancy of
sections 922(h) and 1202(a), the Court maintained that the statutes represented independent criminal laws, each enforceable on its own
terms.' 3 2 The Court further declined to apply the doctrine that ambiguity in criminal statutes should be construed in favor of lenity, stating that
33
no ambiguity was present in the statutes in question.1
As Judge McKay noted in Afflerbach, the Batchelder holding has been
relied upon by a number of lower courts to uphold convictions and sentencing under general statutes allowing greater punishment when a specific, more lenient statute covers a defendant's conduct.' 34 A
comparison of the circuits adopting Batchelderfor this purpose with those
circuits which have followed Busic,' 3 5 reveals that, with two exceptions, 136 the courts applying Batchelder have not adopted the rule announced in Busic.
130. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a).
131. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 116-17.
132. Id. at 118-19.
133. Id. at 121-22.
134. Afflerbach, 754 F.2d at 872 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Carpenter, 611 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980); United States v. Simon, 510 F.
Supp. 232, 237 (E.D. Pa. 1981)). See also United States v. Boggs, 739 F.2d 1376, 1378 n.2
(8th Cir. 1984) (Defendants who moved freight by truck in violation of certain Interstate
Commerce Act provisions were convicted of a felony violation of the Act under a section
generally proscribing interstate shipments of freight not complying with regulations,
though a misdemeanor section of the Act disallowed such shipments specifically by "motor
common carriers."); United States v. Davis, 707 F.2d 880, 883 n.4 (6th Cir. 1983) (government allowed to prosecute conspiracy under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, instead of more
specific state statutes); United States v. Fern, 696 F.2d 1269, 1273-74 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (A
defendant convicted of making a materially false statement to an IRS auditor was prosecuted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 forbidding false statements to be made to
any department or agency of the United States, though 26 U.S.C. § 7207, prescribing a
lesser punishment, applied to false statements made to officers of the IRS. The court
upheld the conviction stating that the existence of a more specific statute would never be
grounds for reversal, citing Batchelder among other cases.); United States v. Anderez, 661
F.2d 404,407 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding convictions under the felony provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 1001 prohibiting false statements to departments or agencies of the United
States and under the misdemeanor provisions of the more specific Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1058); United States v. Abraham, 627
F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1980) (conviction for assaulting a federal officer under 18 U.S.C.
§ 111 upheld though defendant's conduct was more particularly forbidden by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1501 making it a misdemeanor to assault a federal officer serving process).
135. See supra note 98.
136. Davis, 707 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1983) (But the Sixth Circuit's application of
Batchelder came prior to its decision in Schaffner, 715 F.2d 1099, which, though distinguishing Busic, conceded its applicability to criminal punishment statutes.); Abraham, 627 F.2d
205, 206 (9th Cir. 1980) (The Ninth Circuit found that applying the specific statute in this
instance would permit only the filing of misdemeanor charges against an individual assaulting a police officer who was making an arrest as opposed to the usual felony charges
which would apply under any other circumstances).
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Judge McKay correctly pointed out that reliance on Batchelder in opposition to Busic is misplaced. The Supreme Court in Batchelder never
considered the question of whether sentencing may proceed under a
general statute when a specific statute is available. In Batchelder, the defendant's conduct was proscribed by two specific statutes with identical
substantive elements.13 7 Moreover, the fact that Busic was decided subsequent to the Court's decision in Batchelder indicates that the Batchelder
rule allowing discretionary prosecution is limited to cases involving two
38
equally specific statutes.'
The First Circuit, in United States v. Saade, l 9 adopted reasoning similar to Judge McKay's, finding that Batchelder permits prosecutorial discretion only where the Busic principle of statutory construction does not
apply.' 40 In Saade, the defendants entered a military danger zone without authorization during a naval gunnery practice session. 14 1 The government sought to proceed under the sweeping provisions of 33 U.S.C.
§ 1142 which authorizes the Secretary of the Army to prescribe regulations for the use of navigable waters for the protection of life and property. Section 3 of the same title empowers the Secretary to promulgate
similar regulations for waters likely to be endangered by coastal artillery
fire. 143 The government argued that Batchelder permitted prosecution
under either section. 14 4 Citing Busic, the First Circuit held that the specific statute, section 3, was exclusive and that Batchelder would apply only
14 5
if section 1 specifically authorized danger zone regulations.
The soundness of Judge McKay's reasoning in Afflerbach, and the
precise balancing of Batchelder and Busic by the First Circuit in Saade,
demonstrate that Batchelder should not be used in contravention of the
statutory construction maxim articulated in Busic.
c.

The Tenth Circuit Since Afflerbach

Since the Tenth Circuit decided Afflerbach, it has considered the
question of prosecution under general versus specific statutes on two
occasions. In Timberlake v. United States,14 6 defendants were indicted for
transportation of drugs as a part of a conspiracy. 14 7 The defendants
plead guilty to two and three counts of conspiracy, respectively, including counts based upon specific and general conspiracy statutes. 14 8 Fol137. Aifferbach, 754 F.2d at 872 (McKay, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. 652 F.2d i126 (Ist Cir. 1981).
140. Id. at 1132.
141. Id. at 1129.
142. 33 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
143. 652 F.2d at 1130 n.4.
144. Id. at 1132 n.5.
145. Id. at 1132 & n.7.
146. 767 F.2d 1479 (10th Cir. 1985).
147. d. at 1480.
148. One defendant plead guilty to conspiracy to import cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 963 (1982), conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(1982), and conspiracy to travel in interstate and foreign commerce with intent to promote
unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) (general conspiracy statute). The
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lowing the imposition of sentences, the defendants retained new counsel
and moved to vacate the sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.149
The defendants asserted that sentencing under multiple conspiracy stat50
utes constituted double jeopardy in violation of the fifth amendment.
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Doyle writing, explained that a single illegal
act may be punished under several statutory provisions, and added that
the act may be punished "under the general conspiracy statute (18
U.S.C. § 371) and a more specific conspiracy statute."' 5'1 While Judge
Doyle did not cite his opinion in Afflerbach, the similarity of the holdings
is evident.
Judge McKay dissented, noting that the general rule allowing prosecution of a single conspiracy under several statutes applies only when
charges are based on two or more specific conspiracy statutes.' 52 Following reasoning similar to that expressed in his dissent in Afferbach, but
citing cases pertaining specifically to conspiracy statutes, 15 3 Judge McKay argued that the defendants in Timberlake should have been convicted
54
and sentenced only under the specific statutes.1
More recently, in United State v. Largo, 1 55 the Tenth Circuit heard an
appeal by a defendant convicted of converting to his own use money
belonging to the United States. 156 The charges stemmed from the defendant's embezzlement of federal funds provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to a local childhood development program. 15 7 The
defendant argued on appeal, inter alia, that he was improperly convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 641,158 when 25 U.S.C. § 450,159 prescribing a lesser
punishment, specifically prohibited embezzlement of Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance funds.160 The Tenth Circuit found
the issue to be controlled by Afflerbach and rejected the defendant's argument. 16 1 Judge McKay, again dissenting, filed a separate opinion,
nearly identical in language, analysis, and authority to his dissent in
62
Afflerbach.1
second defendant plead guilty to the conspiracy charges under sections 963 and 371. 767
F.2d at 1481.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982).
150. Timberlake, 767 F.2d at 1481.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1483 (McKay, J., dissenting).
153. 767 F.2d at 1484 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Corral, 578 F.2d
570, 572 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Mori,444 F.2d 240, 245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); Enzor
v. United States, 262 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 953 (1959)).
154. 767 F.2d at 1486.
155. 775 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1985).
156. Id. at 1100.
157. Id.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982).
159. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1982).
160. Largo, 775 F.2d at 1100.
161. Id. at 1101.
162. Id. at 1102-04 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit, in Afflerbach, again demonstrated its willingness
to uphold criminal sentences when sound reasoning and ample authority suggest a contrary result. In subsequent decisions, the Tenth Circuit
has found itself bound by the precedent set in Afflerbach. While the
Tenth Circuit in Afflerbach did not rely on the Supreme Court's decision
in Batchelder to support its holding, future decisions will do well to heed
Judge McKay's artful distinction of that case from cases involving specific and general criminal statutes. Finally, if the Tenth Circuit wants to
square itself with the decisions of sister circuits and with its own holding
in Otero, 16 3 it must consistently acknowledge the fundamental principle
of statutory construction that a general sentencing statute may not be
applied in derogation of a specific one covering the same conduct.
C.

Restitution and the Seventh Amendment: United States v. Watchman
1.

Background

In United States v. Watchman,' 6 4 the defendant, a Native American
man, plead guilty to an indictment for assault with intent to murder on
an Indian reservation. 16 5 The victim, a Native American woman, received serious injuries requiring extensive medical treatment. 166 In sentencing Watchman, the district court ordered him to pay the victim
restitution in the amount of $13,556.88. 1 6 7 This order was based on 18
U.S.C. § 3579,168 which authorizes an order of restitution, and 18
U.S.C. § 3580,169 which specifies procedures to be used before restitution can be ordered. Watchman's motion to reduce his sentence was
170
denied and he appealed, attacking the restitution award specifically.
He challenged the constitutionality of the statutes authorizing restitution, the amount of restitution awarded and the procedure used for determining that amount. 17 1 As to the constitutionality of the statutes
authorizing restitution, Watchman urged that the restitution award
amounted to a civil judgment in excess of twenty dollars, thereby requir72
ing a jury trial under the seventh amendment.1
2.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion

The Tenth Circuit, Judge Seth writing for the court, rejected
163. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.

164. 749 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1984).
165. Id. at 618.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 617.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3579(c), (0(4) (Supp. 11 1984)
(renumbered as section 3663, Oct. 12, 1984; effective Nov. 1, 1986).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 3580 (1982) (renumbered as section 3664, Oct. 12, 1984; effective
Nov. 1, 1986).
170. 749 F.2d at 617.
171. Id.
172. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment states: "In suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved."
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Watchman's claim that the restitution statute was unconstitutional. In
so doing, the court refused to recognize the restitution award as a civil
action governed by the seventh amendment. Rather, the court held that
73
restitution is a "constitutional extension of sentencing."
In a very brief analysis, the court held that the enforcement clause
in the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982,174 providing that a
restitution order may be enforced by the victim in the same manner as
176
civil action, 175 did not affect the nature of the sentencing hearing.
Distinguishing between civil adjudications and sentencing, the court
noted that the victim does not appear as a party in the determination of
restitution and is not entitled to appeal the order. 177 The court was
persuaded by the analysis expounded in United States v. Brown. 17 8 Noting
that the sixth amendment permits length of incarceration to be determined at a non-jury sentencing hearing, the Second Circuit in Brown
ruled that restitution determined at sentencing does not infringe upon
seventh amendment guarantees.' 79 Finally, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the concept of restitution was in place when the seventh
amendment was adopted, implying that the framers understood restitution to be a criminal sanction.' 8 0
The court then looked to the lower court's factual findings and procedures and determined that its findings of fact were deficient. 18 The
court ruled that the Act requires sentencing courts to make certain factual determinations when the victim has received physical injuries inflicted by the defendant. 18 2 These determinations include the extent of
the victim's losses,1 83 and the defendant's financial condition and ability
to pay under the Act. 184 While approving the use of presentence reports as a fact-finding tool, the court held that such reports may be too
general to suffice as the sole source of information in the determination
of restitution.' 8 5 The court found that the sentencing court record did
not, therefore, reflect sufficient development of facts regarding the victim's restitutionary needs. 186 Accordingly, the restitution order was va173. 749 F.2d at 617.
174. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-14, 3579-80 (1982) (hereinafter referred to as "VWPA" or
"the Act").

175.
176.
177.
178.

18 U.S.C. § 3579(h).
749 F.2d at 617.
Id.
744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 599 (1984).

179. Id. at 909-10.
180. Watchman, 749 F.2d at 617.
181. Id. at 618-19. Congress has mandated that certain factual determinations be made
and that certain procedures be followed. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3580.
182. Id. at 618 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(2) (1982)).
183. Id. Additionally, the victim must participate in the fact finding process and the
record must reflect such participation. Id.
184. Id. In Watchman, the necessity of such fact gathering was particularly acute.
Watchman had been declared indigent for the purpose of representation at trial. Id.
185. Id. at 619. The government has the burden of developing sufficient facts on behalf of the victim and the defendant has the burden of developing facts on his own behalf.

Id.
186. The trial court had relied on a presentence report and "figures" related to the
victim's "losses" which were determined by telephone conversations with unidentified
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cated and the case remanded. 187
3.

Analysis
a.

The Seventh Amendment

The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982188 provides, in part,
that a judge sentencing an offender, in addition to or in lieu of any other
penalty, may order that the offender make restitution to any victim of
the offense.18 9 The Act thus allows a victim to recover damages without
bringing a separate civil action against the offender. The amount of restitution is determined at sentencing without the right to jury trial. This
attempt by Congress to expedite justice has recently met with some
criticism.
Relying on the distinction between legal and equitable proceedings,
one commentator has argued that the Act violates the seventh amendment. 190 The Act authorizes essentially three types of restitution: return of property stolen, damaged or destroyed, or its value;
compensation by the offender to the victim for medical expenses and
lost income; and, payment of funeral expenses where the offense results
in the death of the victim. 19 1 Noting the familiar principle that the seventh amendment preserves the right to jury trial as it existed at English
common law when the amendment was adopted in 1791,192 that commentator states that only the first type of restitution would be considered a remedy in equity in which the offender was required to "disgorge
ill-gotten gains"' 9 3 without the right to a jury trial.19 4 The second and
third categories represented remedies at common law for which the defendant was entitled to demand a jury. 19 5
In addition, the restitution order authorized by the Act shares a
number of characteristics with traditional civil actions. The sentencing
persons. The record failed to reflect that the victim had ever been interviewed as to her
"losses." Id.

187. 749 F.2d at 619.
188. See supra note 174.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982).
190. See Raymond, The Unconstitutionalityof the Victim and Witness Protection Act Under the
Seventh Amendment, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1590 (1984).
191. Id. at 1592-93 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(l)-(b)(3) (1982)).
192. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (a jury
trial is constitutionally mandated if a right to it existed in England in 1791 when the seventh amendment was ratified).
193. See Raymond, supra note 190, at 1597 & n.39 (citing 5J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT &J.
WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

38.24[2] ("In equity, restitution is usually thought

of as a remedy by which defendant is made to disgorge ill-gotten gains or to restore the
status quo or to accomplish both objectives.") (footnote omitted)).
194. See Raymond, supra note 190, at 1596 & n.32 (citing Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) ("It is well known, that in civil causes in courts of equity and admiralty, juries do not intervene, and that courts of equity use the trial by jury only in extraordinary cases, to inform the conscience of the court.").
195. Raymond, supra note 190, at 1595 & n.31 (citing S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw 419 (2d ed. 1981) ("Even if a misdemeanor was brought

before the King's Bench, it was treated wholly as a crime, the injured party being left to
bring separate proceedings for compensation if he would.").
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court, pursuant to the Act, may order restitution only where there is a
19 6
only to the extent of the victim's injury, 19 7 and only to the
victim or his heirs or designees. 9 8 Further, the amount of restitution
awarded is set off against any judgment the victim may recover in a separate civil proceeding. 199 Finally, it is argued that the award of restitutionary relief puts the offender in precisely the same position as a losing
defendant in a civil suit in the sense that he is made to pay the injured
200
party damages which are determined without the benefit of a jury.
The sole case finding the Act unconstitutional is United States v. Welden.2 0 1 This decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama was reversed on the seventh amendment issue
by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Satterfield.20 2
Nevertheless, the district court's reasoning in Welden is worthy of inspection since several United States circuit courts have examined the arguments set forth by the district court in Welden prior to and since
20 3
modification of the decision on appeal.
In an analysis which has been described as "far from rigorous, 2 0 4
the district court in Welden found that the portions of the Act pertaining
to restitution violate the seventh amendment.2 0 5 The Welden court
stated initially that 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h), by allowing enforcement of the
restitution order by the victim in the same manner as a civil action, turns
the order into a civil judgment. 20 6 The court noted that the seventh
amendment requires that "the right of jury trial shall be preserved" in
'20 7
civil cases "where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars."
The court was further persuaded that the res judicata effect of proceedvictim,

196. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982) ("The court... may order. . . that the defendant
make restitution to any victim of the offense.").
197. See S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2515, 2536 ("The premise of [the section governing restitution] is that the court
• . . should insure that the wrongdoer make goods [sic], to the degree possible, the harm
he has caused to his victim.").
198. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(4) (1982) permits the victim to designate a person or organization to receive the restitution.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(2) (1982) ("Any amount paid to a victim under an order of
restitution shall be set off against any amount later recovered as compensatory damages by
such victim ..
").
200. Raymond, supra note 190, at 1598.
201. 568 F. Supp. 526 (1983), rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d
827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2362 (1985).
202. 743 F.2d 827, 831.
203. See United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 479-80 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 909-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 599 (1984); United States v.
Florence, 741 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1984).
204. Raymond, supra note 190, at 1590 n.6.
205. 568 F. Supp. at 534. Aside from the seventh amendment infirmities, the Welden
court found the Act consistent with requirements of the eighth and sixth amendments and
inconsistent with the due process and equal protection requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 533-35. The due process and equal protection questions analyzed in Welden, however, were not raised on appeal in Watchman and are therefore beyond
the scope of this survey discussion.
206. Id. at 534; See 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) (1982) ("An order of restitution may be enforced by the United States or a victim named in the order to receive the restitution in the
same manner as a judgment in a civil action.").
207. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VII).
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ings under the Act rendered such proceedings civil "suit[s] at common
law" within the contemplation of the seventh amendment. 20 8 The disclassified
trict court also ruled that the restitution hearing could not 2be
09
as a proceeding in equity, for which a jury is not required.
Arguments advanced by the district court in Welden, and in commentary offering more developed constitutional criticism, have not persuaded courts considering the seventh amendment question. In
Watchman, the Tenth Circuit became the fourth federal appellate court
to address the constitutionality of the Act under the seventh amendment. 210 Since then, three other circuits and one district court have
faced seventh amendment attacks upon the Act's validity. 2 11 In each

case the court has held that restitution proceedings under the Act are
properly classified as criminal sentencing rather than civil judgment and
upheld the Act.
The courts have advanced four basic reasons for this characterization. First, legislative history advises that the Act should be construed to
create a criminal sanction. Second, a restitution hearing focuses on appropriate punishment of the offender rather than the precise compensation of the victim sought in a civil action. Third, an award of restitution
advances traditional goals of the criminal system. Fourth, the factors
considered by the district court in Welden do not transform the restitution hearing into a civil proceeding.
The question of whether the Act imposes a criminal or civil penalty
has been held to be, in the first instance, one of statutory construction.2 12 In attempting such construction, two courts have relied, in part,
2 13
upon legislative history. The Third Circuit, in United States v. Palma,
pointed generally to the Senate Report highlighting the objective underlying the Act. The Report refers to restitution as "victim-oriented sentencing" and notes that "[t]his kind of sentencing" was not specially
authorized prior to the Act. 2 14 In United States v. Ciambrone,2 15 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York cited
208. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e) (1982) (directing that the restitution order shall "estop" the defendant from denying the essential allegations in a subsequent civil
proceeding).
209. Id.
210. The first three federal circuit cases addressing the question were: Satterfield, 743
F.2d at 836-39; Brown, 744 F.2d at 908-11; and, Florence, 741 F.2d at 1067-68.
211. Palma, 760 F.2d at 479-80; United States v. Durham, 755 F.2d 511, 514 (6th Cir.
1985); United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, i391-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 93
(1985); United States v. Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. 563, 567-68 (S.D. N.Y. 1984).
212. Florence, 741 F.2d at 1068; Keith, 754 F.2d at 1391. See generally United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). In Ward, the United States Supreme Court suggested a
two-level inquiry to determine whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or
criminal. First, it must be determined "whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing
mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or another."
Second, if Congress intended to establish a civil penalty, is the statutory scheme "so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate that intention?" 448 U.S. at 248-49.
213. 760 F.2d at 479.
214. S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprintedin 1982 U.S. ConE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2515, 2537.
215. 602 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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the floor statement of one House member that restitution would be "a
sentence that could, in and of itself, be imposed" and that the legislation
"does not intend that restitution become a substitute for civil
."216
damages ..
Courts have also focused on the characteristics of a restitution hearing and the factors considered in the determination of restitution which
distinguish the proceeding from civil suits at common law. The Second
Circuit, in United States v. Brown, 2 17 pointed out that the victim is not a
party to a sentencing hearing and therefore has only a limited ability to
influence the outcome. He cannot control the presentation of evidence
in either the criminal trial or the sentencing hearing and is not even
guaranteed the right to testify as to his losses. Neither can he appeal if
the award appears inadequate. 2 18 The Brown court further noted that a
court imposing an order of restitution is required to consider the defendant's ability to pay, information generally inadmissible in a civil
2 19
The victim may therefore be awarded less than full compensasuit.
220
tion solely because of the offender's financial circumstances.
One writer has noted additional features of the restitution process
which are distinct from features characterizing civil actions. The restitution order considers the defendant's background and is balanced with
other forms of sentencing to achieve the maximum rehabilitative effect. 22 1 Moreover, a victim may not recover speculative damages such
as "pain and suffering" 2 22 and the sentencing court may, at its discretion, refuse to award restitution altogether, 2 23 an option clearly unavailable at common law.
The Second Circuit's opinion in Brown also illustrates the argument
that the Act advances the traditional objectives of criminal sentencing.
The prospect of having to pay restitution adds to the deterrent effect of
fines and imprisonment and the defendant may feel less likely to be excused from such a sentence. 224 Moreover, restoration of the victim to
his condition prior to the offense satisfies society's interest in peaceful
retribution. 2 25 Restitution also contributes to rehabilitation in several
ways: the offender is forced to acknowledge the harm done to his victim
and assume personal responsibility for righting his wrong; the offender
can develop a sense of accomplishment; and the option of imposing a
216. Id. (citing 128 CONG. REC. H8467 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep.
McCollum)).
217. 744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 599 (1984).
218. Id. The Tenth Circuit adopted this analysis in Watchman. See supra note 177 and
accompanying text.
219. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a)); see also Brown, 760 F.2d at 479; Ciambrone, 602 F.
Supp. at 568.
220. Id.
221. Project, Congress Opens a Pandora'sBox - The Restitution Provisions of the Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 541 (1984).
222. Id. at 542 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b) (1982) (providing the types of damages for
which the court may require a defendant to make restitution)).
223. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3579(d)).
224. Brown, 744 F.2d at 909.
225. Id.
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restitution order represents a useful rehabilitative compromise between
22 6
imprisonment and probation.
Finally, courts deciding the issue subsequent to Welden have persuasively found that the factors relied on by the Welden court do not change
the restitution hearing into a civil proceeding. The Eighth Circuit, in
United States v. Florence,2 27 disagreed with the district court's contention
in Welden that the Act's enforcement provision renders the restitution
proceeding a civil action. The court argued that section 3580(e) specifically contemplates the possibility of civil actions subsequent to the restitution order at sentencing. 2 28 In Brown, the Second Circuit
acknowledged that the enforcement provision authorized procedures
similar to those for enforcing a civil judgment, but held that such similarities do not transform the nature of the restitution award so long as
restitution is a permissible form of punishment. 22 9 Furthermore, the
court cited legislative history specifying that the victim's right to enforce
the restitution order was enacted only to supplement the government's
normal enforcement procedures, thus "increas[ing] the victim's chances
of collecting restitution. ' 23 0 Therefore, a restitution order is to be primarily enforced by normal governmental procedures for enforcing any
criminal sanction.
The second argument advanced by the district court in Welden, that
the res judicata effect of a restitution order in subsequent civil actions
renders the restitution hearing civil in nature, has also met with effective
opposition. The Third Circuit, in Palma, pointed out that the collateral
estoppel provision merely codifies the general rule that a criminal conviction may be accorded collateral estoppel effect as to some issues
raised in a subsequent civil suit. 23 ' Furthermore, the defendant is estopped to deny only the essential allegations underlying the criminal
conviction, established by a plea of guilty or by a jury at the time of
trial. 23 2 Facts regarding the extent and nature of the victim's injury are
2 33
not given the same effect.
In United States v. Satterfield,2 34 the Eleventh Circuit heard an appeal
brought in the name of one of Welden's co-defendants. The court upheld the convictions and sentence to imprisonment of each defendant, 23 5 but reversed the district court's holding in Welden that the VWPA
was unconstitutional under the seventh amendment. 2 3 6 Relying upon
226. Note. Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A ProceduralAnalysis,97 HARV. L REv.

931, 938 (1984).
227. 741 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1984).
228. Id. at 1068. See supra note 208.
229. 744 F.2d at 910.
230. Id. The court noted that the enforcement provisions of the Act "'parallel" en-

forcement procedures for the collection of fines under 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (1982). Id.
231. Palma, 760 F.2d at 475.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2362 (1985).
235. Id. at 851.
236. Id. at 836-39.
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analysis similar to that set forth in Brown, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
the district court's argument that the right to "civil" enforcement renders the restitution hearing a civil proceeding 2 3 7 and, using analysis
similar to that articulated in Palma, rejected the district court's finding
that the resjudicata effect of a restitution order in later civil actions also
serves to transform the restitution hearing into a civil proceeding. 23 8 In
addition, the court examined legislative history and traditional goals of
criminal sentencing to support its holding that the restitution proceed23 9
ing is criminal, rather than civil in nature.
b.

Fact Finding Requirements

Most of the Victim and Witness Protection Act is dedicated to
amendments of the Crimes and Criminal Procedure sections of title
18.240 In addition, however, the Act amends Rule 32(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 32(c) governs "Presentence Investigation." 2 4 1 Subsection (c)(1) of Rule 32 instructs the probation service

of the court to make a presentence investigation and report to the court
before any sentence is imposed or probation is granted. 2 4 2 Subsection
(c)(2) of the rule sets forth the required elements of the presentence
report. 2 4 3 Prior to the Act, information relevant to a restitution order
was not an element of the report. Rather, the report was designed to

focus primarily on the behavorial background of the defendant. However, the Act amended subsection (c)(2) to require a "victim impact
237. Id. at 838-39. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
238. Id. at 838 (citing S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2515, 2536). See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
239. Id. at 837 (citing S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2536 ("[R]estitution ... lost its priority status in the
sentencing procedures of our federal courts long ago."); id. at 2538 ("permitting its use in
conjunction with imprisonment, fine, suspended sentence, or other sentence imposed by
the court"); 128 CONG. REC. H8467 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Representative
McCollum) ("Restitution would become a sentence that could in and of itself be imposed ....
This legislation does not intend that restitution become a substitute for civil
damages."); [further citation omitted]).
240. See Victim and Witness Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982).
241. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c).
242. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1) remains unchanged by the Act. It provides in part:
(c) Presentence Investigation.
(1) When Made. The probation service of the court shall make a
presentence investigation and report to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of probation unless, with the permission of the court, the
defendant waives a presentence investigation and report, or the court finds that
there is in the record information sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise of
sentencing discretion, and the court explains this finding on the record.
243. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) provides:
(2) Report. - The presentence report shall contain (A) any prior criminal record of the defendant;
(B) a statement of the circumstances of the commission of the offense and
circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior;
(C) information concerning any harm, including financial, social, psychological. and physical harm, done to or loss suffered by any victim of the
offense; and
(D) any other information that may aid the court in sentencing, including
the restitution needs of any victim of the offense.
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statement" containing information concerning specific losses suffered
by the victim of the offense.

244

The Tenth Circuit's holding in Watchman, that the trial court should
not have relied solely upon the presentence report in determining the
amount of restitution, reflects a judicial effort to pay even closer attention to the victim's damages. Other federal courts have reached a variety of conclusions as to the adequacy of methods used to determine a
restitution award.
Two federal courts have upheld findings of fact based exclusively on
the presentence reports, 24 5 but neither of those decisions necessarily
conflicts with the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Watchman. As noted in Watchman, the Eighth Circuit in Florence implicitly approved a restitution award
determined by reference to the presentence report alone. 24 6 The Tenth
Circuit in Watchman took issue with the Florence court's exclusive reliance
on the presentence report, apparently understanding Florence to stand
for the proposition that the presentence report is the only fact finding
resource necessary in cases involving restitution awards.2 4 7 But the
Eighth Circuit did not raise the adequacy of fact finding as a specific
issue and did not suggest that presentence reports provided sufficient
information in all cases. In Palma, the Third Circuit upheld the exclusive
use of a presentence report which detailed losses sustained by the victim
and specifically analyzed the defendant's financial circumstances. 248
The Palma court's approval of fact finding absent testimony by the victim
is distinguishable from Watchman inasmuch as the victim in Palma, a
2 49
bank, was incapable of personal allocution.
Other federal courts have recognized the value of resources other
than the presentence report in determining a victim's restitutionary
needs. In Brown, the Second Circuit found that facts gleaned from the
trial court record, in addition to conclusions set forth in the probation
officer's presentence report, provided the sentencing judge with ample
evidence to allow proper determination of the restitution amount. 2 50 In
Ciambrone, the federal district court ordered a hearing to resolve
factual
25
questions concerning the damages claimed by the victim.
244.

' The court

See supra note 243. The Senate Report accompanying the Act's amendments to

Rule 32(c)(2) discloses that the victim impact statement is intended "as a first step to ensure that the victim's side is heard and considered by adjudicative officials." S. REP. No.
532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2515, 2519.
The Senate Report further advise- that courts are encouraged to take advantage of additional victim assistance techniques such as "allocution by the victim at the sentencing. . .. ." Id. The victim impact statement was proposed to "lend balance to the present
information available to the court .... ." Id. at 2520.
245. United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d at 476; United States v. Florence, 741 F.2d at
1067.
246. Florence, 741 F.2d at 1067.
247. Watchman, 749 F.2d at 617.
248. Palma, 760 F.2d at 476. Apparently no factual testimony was heard regarding the
defendant's financial condition or the extent of the victim's losses.
249. See supra note 248.
250. 744 F.2d at 908 n.l.
251. 602 F. Supp. at 570-71.
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ordered the hearing after consideration of documents and memoranda
provided by the parties, as opposed to the presentence report.25 2 The
court found that the risk of error in arriving at a restitution amount without a hearing would be greater than the burden imposed by such a
253
hearing.
While such investigative techniques may be useful in determining
the restitution award, it is clear that Rule 32 does not necessarily compel
2 54
fact finding procedures beyond review of the presentence report.
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Keith, 2 55 for example, rejected the
defendant's argument that failure to provide an evidentiary hearing on
the amount of restitution constituted an abuse of discretion. 2 6 The
court noted that Rule 32 provides that a trial court may, in its discretion,
entertain testimony relating to alleged factual inaccuracy of the
presentence report, 2 5 7 but added that no form of hearing is sanctioned
by Rule 32 or the Act unless a factual dispute exists regarding the
presentence report. 25 8 The Act clearly does not prescribe fact-finding
procedures beyond consideration of the presentence report. 2 59
The presentence report is intended to satisfy the need for accurate
assessment of a victim's restitutionary needs. Legislative history indicates that the report should include the detailed infornation necessary
to reach an informed conclusion as to the appropriate amount of restitution. 260 The legislative history makes it equally clear that additional efforts to ascertain relevant facts are not precluded. 26 1 The Tenth Circuit
in Watchman was faced with a presentence report that was inadequate for
factual determinations associated with the restitution order. Accordingly, the court demanded a record reflecting more active participation
by the victim in the fact-finding process. 26 2 Likewise, other courts have
required supplemental procedures where additional facts were necessary. The essential concern expressed by Congress and the courts is not
the adequacy of victim impact statement per se, but the sufficiency of facts
ultimately relied upon. The presentence report containing the victim
impact statement may or may not accomplish this purpose. When it
does not, additional requirements are warranted.
5.

Conclusion

The Victim and Witness Protection Act empowers the sentencing
252. Id. at 571.
253. Id. at 570.
254. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(b) (1982) empowers the court to order the probation service to
issue a presentence report. Section 3580(a) deliniates information to be considered by the
sentencing judge in determining restitution. The Act does not specify other means by
which the court may acquire necessary information.
255. 754 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1985).
256. Id. at 1392.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1393.
259. See supra note 254.
260. S. REP. No. 532, supra note 198, at 2519.
261. Id.
262. 749 F.2d at 618-19.
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judge to address more adequately the needs of criminal victims. Critics
of the Act fail to acknowledge the multi-dimensional nature of the criminal system. Penalties imposed upon criminal offenders may serve traditional penal objectives and simultaneously satisfy compensatory needs
of criminal victims. Indeed, it is persuasively argued that restitution advances such objectives. There is simply no rigid dichotomy between
civil and criminal actions such that the seventh amendment precludes a
sentencing court from attending to some of the losses suffered by victims of criminal acts. Procedurally, Congress has authorized the formulation and consideration of presentence reports to facilitate accurate
determination of restitution amounts. Where the reports do not satisfy
the need for specific factual determination, Congress has allowed sentencing courts flexibility in ordering further fact-finding procedures.
II.

MAIL FRAUD AND THE GOOD FAITH DEFENSE:
UNITED STATES V. HOPKINS

A.

Facts

The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Hopkins,2 6 3 reconsidered the
sufficiency of instructions pertaining to the "good faith" defense to mail
fraud charges. 2 64 The defendant, Hopkins, was charged with devising a
scheme to defraud and obtain money by inducing people, generally of
Native American descent, to pay for his assistance in filing a claim for an
Indian land allotment in Nevada. 26 5 Hopkins told claimants that by submitting a claim form and nominal recording fee to the Clark County,
Nevada, Record's Office, an individual, by virtue of Indian ancestry,
could obtain up to 160 acres of public domain land in Nevada for various purposes. 2 66 Hopkins also represented that claimants would have
some rights in the land when the claim was filed. For his assistance,
Hopkins charged between $100 and $125 per claim. 2 67 Contrary to
Hopkins' representations, the land was either unavailable for Indian land
allotments until it was "reclassified" by the Secretary of the Interior, or
2 68
was already patented to other persons.
At trial, Hopkins submitted that the claim procedure was suggested
in good faith, and that he believed claimants would eventually obtain the
263. 744 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1984).
264. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository
for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal
Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly
causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon . . . any such
matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
265. United States v. Hopkins, 716 F.2d 739, 742-43 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1982) (Hopkins 1),
rev'd and vacated on reh'g, 744 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Hopkins II).
266. Hopkins I, 716 F.2d at 743.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 742 n.2.
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lands for which the papers were filed. 2 6 9 Accordingly, Hopkins requested specific instructions on his defense of good faith. 270 This request was denied and Hopkins was subsequently convicted on eleven
counts of mail fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud.
The Tenth Circuit initially upheld the substantive mail fraud conviction, 27 1 ruling, inter alia, that while no specific instruction was given by
the trial court on Hopkins' good faith theory of defense, the instructions
viewed as a whole were sufficient to advise the jury on the defense of
good faith. 27 2 The Tenth Circuit subsequently granted the defendant's
request for rehearing.
B.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion On Rehearing

On rehearing, the Tenth Circuit consolidated Hopkins with United
States v. Peterman 2 73 for en banc consideration of the adequacy of instructions on the good faith defense. 2 74 Judge Seth, writing for the majority, 27 5 ruled that a good faith instruction is required to be given as a
separate subject where "sufficient evidence" supports the defense of
2 76
good faith.
Initially, the court reiterated the well-established rule that "good
faith" is a complete defense to mail fraud charges under section
1341.277 In addition, the court gleaned from previous Tenth Circuit decisions that a defendant is entitled to proper instructions on the good
269. Id. at 746. Hopkins testified at trial that he believed that filing the claim form
served as notice of an Indian allotment selection, that it was a proper method of establishing constructive settlement on the land, and that federal laws restricting availability of the
land did not diminish or impair tribal "vested rights" in the land. Id. at 744 (citing Record
vol. XI at 1227, 1238).
270. The requested instructions provided, in pertinent part:
Bad faith is an essential element of fraudulent intent. Good faith constitutes a
complete defense to one charged with an offense of which fraudulent intent is an
essential element. One who acts with honest intention is not chargeable with
fraudulent intent . . . . [T]o establish fraudulent intent on the part of a person,
it must be established that such persons knowingly and intentionally attempted to
deceive another ...
A man may be visionary in his plans and believe they will succeed, and yet, in
spite of their ultimate failure, be incapable of committing concious fraud.
Id. at 750 n.13 (quoting Record vol. I at 50-51). Relevant portions of the charge given
stated:
To act with intent to defraud means to act knowingly and with specific intent to
deceive. . . .[The acts charged were] alleged to have been done knowingly and
willfully by the defendants. . . .An act is knowingly done if done voluntarily and
intentionally and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.
Id. at 751 n.14 (quoting Record vol. XI at 1369, 1376, 1377).
271. Id. at 752. The court reversed the conspiracy conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence. Id. at 749.
272. Id. at 751-52.
273. No. 82-1100 (10th Cir. 1984). The case was originally submitted to a Tenth Circuit panel but no opinion was filed. The facts of Peterman were not reviewed by the court in
Hopkins I.
274. United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1984).
275. The sole separate opinion was Judge McWilliams' dissent which stated simply that
he remained in agreement with the views expressed by the panel in the initial Hopkins I
decision.
276. Hopkins 11, 744 F.2d at 718.
277. Id.
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faith theory where there is evidence to support that defense and such an
instruction is requested.2 78 Evidence is sufficient to support the defense, the court said, when the jury could reasonably find from such evidence that the defendant, in good faith, believed that the plan would
succeed, however visionary in retrospect it may seem to be, and that the
promises made would be kept and that the representations would be
carried out. 2 79 Most significantly, the court required that the "good
faith" instruction be given as a separate subject and that instructions on
various elements of the mail fraud offense were held insufficient for that
28 1
purpose. 280 Both Hopkins and Peterman were remanded for new trials.
C.

Analysis
1. The Good Faith Defense

Federal courts have long recognized the good faith theory as a complete defense to mail fraud charges. 28 2 While section 1341 does not
specifically mention a requisite statutory intent, courts have read the
mail fraud statute to include among its essential elements, specific intent
to defraud. 28 3 Good faith has been described as the "obverse" of bad
motive or intent to defraud. 28 4 Proof of good faith negates and there2 85
fore operates as a defense to the element of fraudulent intent.
The meaning of "good faith" was, for a time, somewhat obscured.
Language used to describe the concept in the Tenth Circuit and elsewhere was not consistent. 2 86 The first federal case to determine in what
278.

Id. at 717 (citing United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1982); United

States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1978); Sparrow v. United States 402 F.2d 826
(10th Cir. 1968); Steiger v. United States, 373 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1967)).
279. Hopkins 11, 744 F.2d at 717.
280. Id. at 718. The court further specified that the rule articulated is intended to apply equally to substantive and conspiracy counts for mail and wire fraud. Id.
281. Id.
282. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896). In Durland, the defendant was
charged under a predecessor statute to section 1341 with using the mails to further a
fraudulent investment scheme. The Court therein stated:
If the testimony had shown that. . . the defendant. . . had entered in good faith
upon that business, believing that out of the moneys received they could by investment or otherwise make enough to justify the promised returns, no conviction would be sustained, no matter how visionary might seem the scheme.
Id. at 314-15.
283. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 728 F.2d 1402, 1404 (11th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1341 (5th Cir. 1981); Sparrow, 402 F.2d at 829.
284. United States v. Gatewood, 733 F.2d 1390, 1395 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
200 (1984); United States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285, 289 (10th Cir. 1978).
285. Williams, 728 F.2d at 1404; United States v. Lewis, 592 F.2d 1282, 1286 (5th Cir.
1979). See also W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 356 (1972) (noting
that ignorance and mistake, close cousins of good faith, serve as defenses where they negate a required mental state).
286. Although some courts have treated fraudulent intent and good faith as synonymous issues (see, e.g., United States v. Foshee, 569 F.2d 401, 404 n. 3, 405 (5th Cir.), modified on rehk'g, 578 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1978)), they are in fact distinct. The former "is an
element of the offense to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the latter is developed as a defense to be asserted by the defendant as part of his theory of the case and
becomes an issue upon which he is entitled to adequate instructions if the evidence warrants." Sparrow, 402 F.2d at 829. Failure by the defendant to prove his own good faith
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the defendant must have "good faith" was a Tenth Circuit case, Hawley
v. United States. 2 87 Approving the trial court's defense theory instruction, the Hawley court suggested that a defendant acted in good faith
where he "earnestly and sincerely believed the truth of the representations made." 28 8 Some years later, in Steiger v. United States, 28 9 the Tenth
Circuit ordered the trial court to grant a new trial and instruct the jury
that the good faith defense must prevail if the defendant "actually be'2 90
lieved that the plan was practical and would succeed."
There is an apparent consensus among other circuits rejecting the
standard enunciated in Steiger. Four circuits have stated specifically, for
example, that an honest belief that the venture or enterprise will ulti29 1
mately be successful is not in itself a defense to mail fraud charges.
Two of those circuits accept the principle that the defendant's belief in
his plan, however sincere, will not justify "baseless, false, or reckless
representations or promises. ' 29 2 When the Tenth Circuit, in Sparrow v.
United States, 293 combined the "successful plan" language set forth in
Steiger, with the reckless representation caveat elucidated in prior Tenth
Circuit opinions, 2 94 the court announced a new concept of good
faith. 2 9 5 "Thus the good faith of the defendant in the plan or scheme
and good faith intention to carry out the promises and representations
constitutes a defense . . .in a prosecution . . .under the Mail Fraud
Statute .... .296 Hopkins II modified that language only slightly, pointing out that good faith is present when the defendant "believed the plan
would succeed, that the representations would be carried out and [that]
the promises were true." 2 9 7 The notion of good faith articulated in Hopkins II is consistent with The Tenth Circuit's leadership role in refining
the concept.
does not relieve the prosecution of its burden on the element of intent. If the defendant
succeeds in proving good faith, however, the element of intent is necessarily defeated.
287. 133 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1943).
288. Id. at 970.
289. 373 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1967).
290. Id. at 136.
291. United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1779 (1985); United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Amrep Corp. 560 F.2d 539, 547 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United
States v. Diamond, 430 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1970).
292. Stull, 743 F.2d at 446 (quoting Sparrow v. United States, 402 F.2d 826, 828 (10th
Cir. 1968)); Diamond, 430 F.2d at 692 (quoting Sparrow, 402 F.2d at 828)).
293. 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1968).
294. Id. (citing Hawley, 133 F.2d 966; Elbel v. United States, 364 F.2d 127 (10th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1014 (1967)). See also Note, Survey of the Law of Mail Fraud, 1975
U. ILL. L.F. 237, 242.
295. See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 634 F.2d 1285, 1294 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1002 (1982) ("Good faith is employed to mean a genuine belief that the information being sent or given is true. Good faith does not mean an ultimate hope or even faith
that eventually the project will come out even. Nor does it mean a hope or belief that
money which is being obtained will eventually be put back.").
296. Sparrow, 402 F.2d at 828-29 (emphasis added).
297. Hopkins II, 744 F.2d at 718.
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2.

CRIMINAL LAW
Adequacy of Instructions

In federal criminal law, it is axiomatic that a defendant is entitled to
proper instructions on his theory of defense if evidence introduced supports the theory. 298 The federal courts commonly apply this maxim to
the good faith defense in mail fraud prosecutions. 29 9 The more difficult
question concerns the adequacy of instructions given on the defense
theory. The Hopkins II court, overruling precedent, contributed to
Tenth Circuit law most significantly in this area. Prior to Hopkins II, the
Tenth Circuit did not require a separate instruction on good faith,
though the defense had been raised and supported by evidence. The
Tenth Circuit standard frequently used to evaluate the adequacy of
30 0
good faith instructions was set forth originally in Beck v. United States.
Reviewing instructions concerning false representation, intent to defraud, knowledge and willfullness, the Tenth Circuit in Beck found that
the jurors were adequately apprised of the defendant's good faith theory. In so finding, the court ruled that "the sufficiency of the instructions may not be determined by the giving or the failure to give, any one
or more instructions. To make this determination, all of the instructions
30 1
given must be viewed as a whole."
Steiger represents the single deviation from the standard articulated
in Beck. In Steiger, the Tenth Circuit held that general instructions on
willfullness, unlawful intent, specific intent, untruth of a representation,
fraudulent statements, and acting on advice of counsel were insufficient
to "fairly, clearly and fully" submit the defense of good faith interposed
30 2
by each defendant.
The holding in Steiger, however, had been largely ignored in other
cases addressing the issue. In United States v. Westbo, 30 3 for example, the
court adopted the Beck principle and, maintaining that good faith is the
obverse of intent to defraud, ruled that a specific intent instruction "adequately and sufficiently advised the jury about defendant's good-faith30°4
principle theory of defense."
The relationship between fraudulent intent and good faith3 0 5 has
also convinced other circuit courts to dispense with the specific instruction requirement. The First Circuit, in New England Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States,3 0 6 said that instructions on knowledge and specific intent
298. Beck v. United States, 305 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir.) (citing Bird v. United States.
180 U.S. 356 (1901), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890, 895 (1962)).
299. See, e.g., United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1201 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1866 (1985); United States v. Williams, 728 F.2d 1402, 1404 (11th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Seymour, 576 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 857 (1978);
Kroll v. United States, 433 F.2d 1282, 1290 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944
(1971); Steiger v. United States, 373 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1967).
300. 305 F.2d 595 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
301. Beck, 305 F.2d at 599.
302. Steiger, 373 F.2d at 599.
303. 576 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1978).
304. Id. at 289.
305. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
306. 400 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1036 (1969).
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to defraud were "necessarily inconsistent with good faith and forced the
jury to consider good faith and honest belief....-307 The addition of
"other synonyms," the court concluded, was not required.30 8 In United
States v. Wilkinson,3 0 9 the Fifth Circuit held that an instruction on specific
intent was sufficient, effectively equating the concepts of specific intent
and good faith. 310 Specifically relying on language in Westbo, the Ninth
Circuit, in United States v. Cusino,3 11 held that an instruction on specific
312
intent to defraud "can be deemed an instruction on good faith."
Several courts have examined the trial record to determine whether
the jury was adequately apprised of the defendant's good faith defense
or whether a specific instruction should have been given. The Fifth Circuit, in Kroll v. United States,3 13 found that instructions on knowledge,
willfullness and intent, combined with clear statements of the good faith
defense in defendant's testimony, placed the defense adequately before
the jury. 3 14 In New England Enterprises, Inc., the First Circuit, facing the
same issue, stated the determinative question to be "...
whether the
record evidences a substantive presentation of the defense of good faith
to the jury."'3 15 The court found such a presentation in defense counsel's opening statement which emphasized the good faith defense.3 1 6 In
United States v. Diggs, 3 17 the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia noted the similarity between good faith and intent concepts
in the defendant's case and reasoned that the specific intent instruction
given the jury posed the question of good faith "exactly as the defendant
'3 18
himself had presented the issue at trial."
D.

Conclusion

The achilles heel of the Tenth Circuit's first opinion in Hopkins was
its reliance on the erroneous rule announced in Beck. The court permitted the charge on fraudulent intent and other "fundamental issues" to
suffice in communicating the good faith defense because the trial court's
instructions were "viewed as a whole." 3 19 On rehearing, the Tenth Circuit permanently retired that approach. Hopkins II is not the first case
among the various circuits to hold that intent instructions do not direct
the jury's attention to the defense of good faith with sufficient specificity
to avoid reversible error.3 20 Arguably, the rule was announced within
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 71.
Id. (citing Beck, 305 F.2d at 599-600).
460 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 729 (citing New England Enterprises, Inc., 400 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1968)).
694 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983)
Id. at 188.
433 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
Id. at 1290-91.

315.

Aew England Enterprises, Inc., 400 F.2d at 71.

316. Id.
317. 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980).
318. Id. at 1000.
319. Hopkins 1,716 F.2d at 750.

320. See, e.g., United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1345 (5th Cir. 1981) (The Fifth
Circuit distinguished Wilkinson on grounds that the instruction therein actually addressed
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the Tenth Circuit, if not subsequently followed, in Steiger. But Hopkins II
resolved any ambiguity by stating expressly that "[t]he 'good faith' instruction is required to be given as a separate subject."3 2 1 While the
22
court specifically overruled only l'estbo as to contrary points of law,'
the Hopkins opinion clearly represents the abrogation of the standard
originally stated in Beck.
John AL .torrison

,.good faith" specifically. The court then ruled: "Charging the jury that a finding of specific intent to defraud is required for conviction . . .does not direct thejury's attention to
the defense of good faith with sufficient specificity to avoid reversible error.").
321. Hopkins II. 744 F.2d at 718.
322. id.

